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Abstract. This paper presents a model of entry into a network industry. The
entrant tries to attract the customer base of the incumbent service provider. While
the entrant is more eﬃcient, the incumbent enjoys an advantage thanks to a bias
in consumers’ expectations. Buyers enter the game with heterogenous beliefs as to
which of the two ﬁrms is going to win competition. Then expectations converge
- through higher order beliefs - and select one winner, who ends up being the
single supplier. The path of expectations convergence crucially depends on the
pricing policy followed by ﬁrms: so equilibrium beliefs are endogenous. Depend-
ing on parameter values, one of two outcomes obtains: (i) the incumbent is able
to exclude the entrant, by lowering his price below the monopoly level; (ii) the
entrant is successful, by undercutting the incumbent price. Productive eﬃciency
and consumers’ welfare are hurt by exclusion; the entry threat is beneﬁcial to con-
sumers anyway. Imposing compatibility among networks is welfare improving, as
it removes the exclusionary potential enjoyed by the incumbent.
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11 Introduction
This paper deals with entry into a network industry. The traditional liter-
ature in this area1 assumes that the incumbent enjoys an installed base of
"old" consumers, so that the entrant may try to attract only a "new genera-
tion" of buyers. This is equivalent to assuming that the switching costs faced
by old consumers are inﬁnite: as a consequence they are locked-in, giving the
incumbent a competitive advantage over the entrant. While this extreme
assumptiom seems useful to focus the attention on issues like technology
adoption, it is an evident over-simpliﬁcation: in the real world consumers
face ﬁnite switching costs, so an entrant may try to attract all consumers,
old and new ones; in other words, the incumbent’s "installed base" of cus-
tomers is more fragile than it is usually assumed2. Therefore, I present a
model where an entrant challenges the dominant position of an incumbent,
trying to attract the customer base of the latter. In particular, the model
focusses on the competition between two service providers, where all con-
sumers have to decide whether to continue buying the service provided by
the incumbent or to switch and buy the service oﬀered by the entrant.
The main source of competitive advantage for the incumbent comes from
expectations. In a network industry consumers’ utility is increasing in the
number of people buying from the same supplier. So a consumer buys from a
supplier, at a given price, only if he expects that the number of other buyers
doing so is suﬃciently large to be worth paying that price: suppliers then face
a typical "critical mass problem". Now, an incumbent has already reached
the critical mass; to the contrary, a new entrant has to convince consumers
that he will be able to attract a critical mass of buyers, starting from zero.
In a rational expectations model, the problem at hand typically originates
a multiplicity of equilibria. In particular, only two extremes are possible,
since in equilibrium (exogenous) beliefs have to be homogenous across con-
sumers: either all of them believe that the incumbent is going to win over
the entrant, or the opposite holds. In the ﬁrst case the incumbent retains the
whole market and continues to apply the monopolist price. In the alterna-
1See the references in the next Section.
2Of course, switching costs are typically higher for durable goods (e.g. CD players,
video-game consoles, PC hardware) than in other sectors, like payments cards, telecom-
munications, stock exchanges, media: in the former case "old" consumers have bought a
physical good, and the replacement cost might be substantial; in the latter case the cost
of switching to a new service provider is presumably lower.
2tive scenario the entrant attracts all buyers, again applying the monopolist
price. These ﬁndings are at odds with reality, where one observes incum-
bents reacting to entry threats - by lowering prices - and entrants applying
"penetrating" (undercutting) prices.
While maintaining the rational expectations assumption, I try to deepen
the analysis of expectations formation. I assume that consumers enter the
game with heterogenous beliefs: they assign a probability ranging from zero
to one to the incumbent being the winner over the entrant. Then expectations
converge towards one of the two extremes, where all consumers share the
same belief (probability one or zero). Understanding this convergence process
requires specifying consumers’ higher order beliefs (i.e. their expectations
on others’ expectations)3. F i r m sa r ea b l et oi n ﬂuence this process through
prices: the price diﬀerence between incumbent and entrant turns out to be
crucial in determining the path of expectations convergence. For example,
by observing an aggressive pricing policy of the entrant, consumers may be
induced to believe that the entrant is going to be successful and replace the
incumbent; then they will switch to the entrant and join the new network.
Therefore equilibrium expectations are endogenized, as they depend on the
pricing choice of ﬁrms.
In addition, I will assume that the entrant is more eﬃcient, as he has
a lower cost of production - equivalently, he is able to produce a better
service at the same cost. However, consumers may face (ﬁnite) switching
costs and - more importantly - their expectations may favor the incumbent:
more precisely, the aggregate distribution of initial beliefs is possibly biased,
giving the incumbent a competitive advantage (technically: the critical mass
condition allows him to set a higher price than the entrant).
T h eo u t c o m eo ft h eg a m ei st h ef o l l o w i n g . I ft h ea d v a n t a g ee n j o y e db y
the incumbent - in terms of consumers’ expectations - is large enough to
compensate his cost disadvantage, he is able to implement an exclusionary
price: by lowering his price below the monopoly level, he is able to avoid
entry. If the expectations bias favoring the incumbent is not large enough,
t h ee n t r a n ti sa b l et oa t t r a c ta l lb u y e r s ,p r o v i d e dh eu n d e r c u t st h ei n c u m b e n t
3This might seem too demanding, as it requires a high level of rational reasoning
by consumers themselves. However, other approaches are at least as demanding, e.g.:
imposing no coordination failure, so that consumers are able to select a Pareto superior
equilibrium (as in Economides (1996) and Shy (2001)); assuming rational expectations (or
even perfect foresight) with inﬁnite horizon, so that consumers are able to compute their
payoﬀsf o ri n ﬁnitely many periods ahead (as in Katz - Shapiro (1992)).
3price by a suﬃcient amount.
The plan of the paper is the following. In the next section I provide a brief
overview of the literature related to my work. Section 3 contains the model:
after showing the set-up, I derive the multiple equilibria result (Lemma 1),
which serves as a starting point to analyze the equilibrium selection through
higher order beliefs (Proposition 1 and Corollary 1); then the incumbent’s
advantage in terms of expectations is speciﬁed (Proposition 2 and Corollary
2), leading to an equilibrium either with exclusion or with entry (Proposition
3). The entry decision is discussed in Section 4. Some policy implications
are derived is Section 5. Section 6 summarizes the main results.
2 Related literature
The analysis of network externalities in consumption dates back to the pi-
oneering work by Rohlfs (1974), where he studies interdependent demands
in the communications service sector. In particular, he analyzes the start-up
issue, pointing to the central role of the critical mass and ﬁnding that a low
pricing strategy is crucial for the successful marketing of a new service. How-
ever, his model is not framed in a rational expectations context: consumers
react to observed - not to expected - quantities.
The literature on product innovations in network industries has shown
that the rational expectations approach typically lead to multiple equilibria.
Consumers may ﬁnd themselves stuck in an ineﬃcient equilibrium, if this
is supported by expectations: the outcome of the interaction among con-
sumers may be biased for or against innovation, showing "insuﬃcient friction"
or "excess inertia" (see Farrell - Saloner (1986) and Katz - Shapiro (1986,
1992)4). The multiplicity of equilibria emerges also in other contributions,
where competition and compatibility decisions are analyzed in the context of
oligopolystic markets with network externalities (see Katz - Shapiro (1985)).
More recently, competition in markets with two-sided networks have been
studied (see Rochet - Tirole (2003))5.
The papers closest to mine are those by Fudenberg - Tirole (2000) and
4In particular, Farrell - Saloner (1986) analyze predatory pricing by a monopolist in-
cumbent, enjoying an installed base of consumers. Katz- Shapiro (1986) study the pene-
trating pricing strategy of a supplier having proprietary rights to a new technology.
5Overviews of the issues and the literature related to network industries are provided
by Shy (2001), Economides (1996), Katz - Shapiro (1994), Shapiro - Varian (1999).
4by Karlinger - Motta (2006). They show that an incumbent in a network
industry may implement exclusionary pricing. In particular, in F-T a mo-
nopolist sells only to consumers having a high valuation of the network good,
while under the threat of entry it sells also to lower-type consumers, in order
to enlarge his own installed base; I will instead assume homogenous con-
sumers, all of them attaching the same value to the network good. In K-M
the incumbent has to implement some kind of non-linear pricing - two-part
tariﬀs or rebates - in order to avoid entry; to the contrary, in my model the
exclusionary equilibrium may be obtained with linear pricing. In line with
the above-mentioned literature, both F-T and K-M assume that the incum-
bent enjoys an installed base of consumers who have bought his product and
are locked-in: only new consumers may choose to buy the entrant’s prod-
uct; to the contrary, in my approach the incumbent’s advantage (if any) is
due only to expectations. In addition, F-T assume no coordination failure
among consumers, while coordination of expectations is the crucial issue in
my analysis.
Some works on (ﬁnancial) markets and liquidity take an approach similar
to the one taken here, as they do not rely on an installed base of locked-in
consumers who have purchased the incumbent’s good. Traders concentrate
in a single trading venue to enhance liquidity; equilibria where more than one
market exist are possible but very fragile, as a slight change in expectations
makes traders shift and all go to the market with higher liquidity (see Pagano
(1989)). The incumbent’s advantage comes from the fact that, given an
equilibrium, nobody wants to trade in a new market with low liquidity, so
entry may become impossible (see Economides - Siow (1988)).
The other stream of literature linked to this paper is that focussing on
the equilibrium selection in games with multiple equilibria. The classic work
by Harsanyi - Selten (1988) introduces the assumption that, given two equi-
librium points, a player enters the game with a prior probability that one
of them will eventually be the equilibrium, and such prior is uniformly dis-
tributed over the unit interval. Carlsson and van Damne (1993) have intro-
duced global games, where each player observes a noisy signal, relative to an
unobservable state: given that the noise technology is common knowledge,
players are able to select an equilibrium through higher order beliefs. In their
comprehensive treatment of global games, Morris - Shin (2001) also adopt
a neutral prior: each player assumes that the proportion of other players
taking a particular action is a random variable uniformly distributed over
the unit interval. As we shall see below, I assume that each player enters
5the game with a prior probability (ﬁrst order belief), relative to which out
of two equilibria is going to prevail; given that the aggregate distribution of
such beliefs - not necessarily uniform - is common knowledge, they are able
to ﬁgure out higher order beliefs and select one equilibrium.
Finally, there is a wide literature on strategic complementarity and coor-
dination failures (see Cooper - John (1988) and Cooper (1999)): in a context
where the incentive of each player to take a speciﬁca c t i o ni si n c r e a s i n gi n
the number of people taking such action, multiple equilibria may emerge and
players may ﬁnd themselves stuck in a Pareto-inferior equilibrium, as they
lack a coordination device. This is the case in network industries, where
consumers’ demands exhibit positive externalities. We shall see a case of co-
ordination failure below, where consumers do not switch from the incumbent
t oam o r ee ﬃcient entrant, able to apply a lower price.
3T h e m o d e l
3.1 Set-up
The model presented here is focused on a service industry, where network
externalities in consumption are present. Consumers have to decide whether
to continue buying the service provided by the incumbent or to switch and
buy the service oﬀered by the entrant.
More speciﬁcally, let us consider a one-period model. There are two
ﬁrms, indexed by i = I,E: the incumbent (I) and the entrant (E). I has
been a monopolist until yesterday; E is trying to enter the market in the
current period. The services oﬀered by the two competing networks are not
compatible6.B o t h I and E have already paid any sunk costs of entry, so
these are irrelevant for their current decisions. The entrant is more eﬃcient
than the incumbent: in particular, the unit cost of production is zero for E
and c ∈ (0,1] for I7.
6The issue of compatibility is not explicitly addressed in this paper. However the reader
may check that, given the model structure, the incumbent would never agree to compat-
ibility, as this would drive him out of the market: so incompatibility is the equilibrium
market outcome (in other words, it is not imposed by assumption). This feature makes
the model not directly applicable to the analysis of competition among compatible net-
works (e.g. telecommunications). However some implications, as far as the imposition of
compatibility by a regulator is concerned, are derived below (see Section 5).
7Equivalently, E could be assumed to be able to provide a better service at the same
6Each consumer periodically buys one unit of the service. All of them did
buy from I until yesterday. Now, they can choose whether to stay with the
incumbent or shift to the entrant in the current period: the decision space of
ab u y e ri sg i v e nb yd ∈ {I,E}. Depending on his choice, his surplus is going
to be Sd ≡ qd−pd,w h e r eqd ∈ [0,1] is the total number of people buying from
t h es a m ep r o v i d e rh eb u y sf r o m ,a tp r i c epd. The total size of the market is
normalized to 1, so that qI + qE =1 . Any switching cost is captured by the
term c:t h i si sa c t u a l l yt h ec o s td i ﬀerential between the two ﬁrms, net of the
cost (if any) a consumer has to bear for switching from I to E8.
At the start of the period, each supplier makes a binding announcement:
ap r i c epi (i = I,E), with pE ∈ [0,1] and pI ∈ [c,1]9. Given such prices,
consumers simultaneously make their decisions and buy: we label this stage
(consumers’ decisions) as the "game among buyers". The behavior of each
buyer is determined by the comparison between the expected surplus from
staying with the incumbent and from shifting to the entrant: Se
i = qe
i − pi,
for i = I,E (where qe
i is the expected quantity sold by supplier i). Then the
optimal decision of a buyer (denoted by d∗) is determined by the following
rule: d∗ = I if and only if Se
I ≥ Se
E (where we assume that a buyer stays
with the incumbent if he is indiﬀerent).
For the game among buyers, a Nash equilibrium with fulﬁlled expectations
(hereafter: "equilibrium") is described by a quantity q∗
I,s u c ht h a t :g i v e n
qe
I = q∗
I for all buyers, d∗ = I for a number of buyers equal to q∗
I.10 Let’s
deﬁne p ≡ pI − pE; given the above assumptions, the only feasible values of
p are in the interval [c − 1,1].
production cost as I.
8Of course, any switching cost for consumers may be seen as an additional cost for the
entrant - equivalently as a cost advantage for the incumbent - as E has to compensate
buyers to attract them.
9On one hand, a price lower than cost makes a ﬁrm earn a negative proﬁt. In a multi-
period context this might be a feasible option: a ﬁrm might be willing to incur a short
period loss, in order to retain or gain a monopoly rent in the future. However, this issue
cannot be addressed in a one period model.
On the other hand, a price larger than one makes buyers get a negative surplus, even
in the most favorable case where all of them buy from the same provider.
10Of course, the (expected) quantity sold by the incumbent is enough to describe an
equilibrium, since the (expected) quantity sold by the entrant is its complement to one.
73.2 The game among buyers: self-fulﬁlling expecta-
tions and multiple equilibria
The ﬁrst step in ﬁnding the outcome of the interaction among buyers is given
by the following Lemma: this highlights the multiple equilibria resulting from
self-fulﬁlling exogenous expectations, and it will be the starting point for
the main contribution of this paper, namely the analysis of the game among
buyers where equilibrium expectations are endogenoulsy determined through
higher order beliefs (Section 3.3).
Lemma 1 For any feasible value of p, there exist two equilibria of the game
among buyers, where q∗
I =1and q∗
I =0respectively.
Proof. Let qI =1and qe
I =1for all buyers. Condition Se
I ≥ Se
E boils
down to p ≤ 1, which is met. Then d∗ = I for all buyers and q∗
I =1is the
equilibrium.
Let qI =0and qe
I =0for all buyers. Then condition Se
I <S e
E boils down
to p>−1,w h i c hi sm e t . T h e nd∗ = E for all buyers and q∗
I =0is the
equilibrium.
Let qI ∈ (0,1) and qe
I = qI for all buyers. Either qI ≥
1+p
2 or qI <
1+p
2 .I n
the ﬁrst case, Se
I ≥ Se
E → d∗ = I for all buyers: qI =1 . In the second case,
Se
I <S e
E → d∗ = E for all buyers: qI =0 . Both cases lead to a contradiction
with qI ∈ (0,1): so this cannot be an equilibrium.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is simple. Since all buyers share the same
preferences and, in equilibrium, the same expectations, all of them must
behave the same way. Therefore, the only candidate equilibrium points are
the extremes: either q∗
I =1or q∗
I =0 . They are indeed equilibria: one where
the incumbent retains the whole market, and the other one where the entrant
is able to attract all buyers.
Self-fulﬁlling expectations are crucial in determining which of the two
equilibria prevails: if all buyers believe that all of them are going to stay
with the incumbent, then the optimal individual strategy is to do so; if the
opposite expectation is shared among consumers, all of them will shift to
the entrant. Coordination failures are possible. Take, for example, the case
where p>0 and q∗
I =1is the equilibrium: the alternative equilibrium
(q∗
I =0 ) is clearly Pareto superior, but it is not supported by expectations.
Lemma 1 tells us that, for all p o s s i b l el e v e l so ft h ep r i c ed i ﬀerence p,
both equilibria exist. At this level of analysis, the prices announced by the
8two ﬁrms are irrelevant in determining which equilibrium prevails; in other
words, "only expectations matter". Therefore, if the incumbent is supported
by expectations (qe
I =1 ), he is able to retain his dominant position in the
market, even by setting his price at the monopoly level: pI =1(which is also
the equilibrium price absent any entry threat). On the other hand, if the
entrant is supported by expectations (qe
I =0 ), he is able to enter the market
even with pE =1 . These results do not seem to be realistic; in particular, the
commonly observed strategies of entrants involve some sort of "penetrating
pricing", while defensive strategies may lead incumbents to cut their prices
below the monopoly level.
3.3 The game among buyers: higher order beliefs
I introduce the following assumption relative to ﬁrst order beliefs. Each buyer
enters the game attaching a probability α to the equilibrium where q∗
I =1
(and (1 − α) to the alternative equilibrium). The cross-sectional density of
ﬁrst order beliefs is exogenous: f (α),w i t hs u p p o r tα ∈ [0,1] and c.d.f.
F (α),w h e r eF(1) = 1. We might think of α as the belief each buyer holds,
based on his own information about the features of the network services -
oﬀered by I and E -d i ﬀerent from price (for example: quality, marketing
ability of suppliers). What really matters is that ﬁr s to r d e rb e l i e f sa r en o t
equilibrium beliefs (in general). Like any other assumptions so far, this
aggregate distribution of ﬁrst order beliefs is common knowledge (although
a buyer does not observe the individual beliefs of others).
Higher order beliefs are formed by combining this information with the
announcements made by the two suppliers, i.e. prices pI and pE. In particu-
lar, each buyer forms his second order belief by considering the expectations
of other buyers relative to which equilibrium is going to prevail; his third
order belief is then formed by considering the beliefs of other buyers relative
to the expectations of other buyers. Formally, the sequence of events is the
following:
- stage 1: buyers form their ﬁrst order beliefs,
- stage 2: ﬁrms (simultaneously) announce prices,
- stage 3: buyers form their higher order beliefs and one equilibrium is
selected.
This sequence is not chronological, but rather logical. In particular, the
assumption that prices are announced after the formation of ﬁrst order beliefs
captures the fact that ﬁrms are somewhat ﬂexible in setting prices: the
9entrant may adjust his price during the start-up stage, upon observation of
consumers’ attitudes; similarly, the incumbent is able to react to the ability
of his competitor to attract his customers. On the other hand, prices are set
before higher order beliefs are formed, so that consumers are able to exploit
this information to form their expectations. This framework enables us to
analyze the interaction between expectations and prices: ﬁrms are able to
react to consumers’ attitudes, and prices contribute to determine the path
of expectations formation. Expectations are then partially endogenized, as
they are driven (among other things) by prices, which are optimally chosen
by ﬁrms.
Let’s continue to focus on the game among buyers, namely stage 3 above,
taking prices as given. In the next sub-section, we will proceed backward and
solve the ﬁrms decision problem, namely stage 2 above, thus determining the
equilibrium for the complete game.
Proposition 1 For any c.d.f. F (α) of ﬁrst order beliefs, the unique equi-
librium of the game among buyers is q∗




;o t h e r w i s e
the unique equilibrium is q∗
I =0 .









First order beliefs. Each buyer has qe
I = α,w h e r eα is drawn from f (α).
Second order beliefs. The number of buyers with ﬁrst order beliefs such
that Se
I ≥ Se




,b e c a u s eSe
I ≥ Se
E ⇐⇒ α ≥
1+p
2 .T h i s






Third order beliefs. For all buyers, second order beliefs are such that
Se
I ≥ Se




, which is met. This is common knowledge,
so qe
I =1for all buyers. Therefore q∗
I =1is the equilibrium.





First and second order beliefs:a sa b o v e .
Third order beliefs. For all buyers, second order beliefs are such that
Se
I <S e




, which is met. This is common knowledge,
so qe
I =0for all buyers. Therefore q∗
I =0is the equilibrium.
Corollary 1 For any c.d.f. F (α) of ﬁrst order beliefs, there is a unique
p ∈ (−1,1),d e ﬁned by equation (1), such that: the unique equilibrium of the
10game among buyers is q∗













,a st h i si n e q u a l i t yb o i l sd o w n
to −1 < 1.F o rp =1 , the opposite is true. Both sides of equation (1) are
continuous and strictly monotone in p: the LHS is increasing and the RHS
is decreasing. Therefore, there exists a unique p ∈ (−1,1) satisfying equation




iﬀ p ≤ p. This, together with Proposition
1, proves Corollary 1.
Proposition 1 shows that, for given aggregate distribution of ﬁrst order
beliefs, the price diﬀerence p is crucial to determine which equilibrium pre-
vails. Intuitively, the process of expectations formation is as follows. Each
buyer enters the game with an expectation given by his own ﬁrst order belief:
qe
I = α. Then he computes a (second order) expectation, by considering the
(ﬁrst order) expectations of other consumers: he ﬁnds that consumers buying
from I are those for which α ≥
1+p




;t h i s






. Then each buyer computes his (third order) expectation,
by considering the second order expectations of others: now he ﬁnds that, if




, buying from the incumbent gives all consumers a higher
surplus than buying from the entrant; this is known by everybody, so expec-
tations further converge to qe
I =1 , supporting the equilibrium where q∗
I =1 .
If the opposite inequality holds, expectations converge to qe
I =0 ,s u p p o r t i n g
the equilibrium where qe
I =0 .
The critical mass concept may be applied to understand what drives the
above result. Let us deﬁne the critical mass for the incumbent (cmI)a st h e
minimum (expected) level of his sales, such that his customers get a surplus
(weakly) higher by staying with him rather than by shifting to the entrant;
formally, the lowest value of qe
I such that Se
I ≥ Se
E. This inequality may be
written as qe
I −pI ≥ (1−qe
I)−pE,f r o mw h i c hcmI =
1+p
2 . The critical mass
for the entrant may be derived in a similar way: cmE =
1−p
2 . Therefore, we
have two mutually exclusive critical mass conditions: one for the incumbent
(qe
I ≥ cmI)a n do n ef o rt h ee n t r a n t( qe
E >c m E)11. Note how the critical
11The strict inequality must hold for the entrant, due to the assumption that consumers
stay with the incumbent in case of indiﬀerence.
11masses depend on prices: for example, by lowering his price the incumbent
is able to lower his own critical mass and to increase the critical mass of the
entrant, thus making entry more diﬃcult. Now, consumers enter the game
with heterogenous beliefs; then expectations converge as they try to ﬁgure
out which ﬁrm will achieve its critical mass; as prices aﬀect critical masses,
they act as a coordination device among buyers. For example, by observing
an aggressive pricing policy of the entrant, each consumer may be induced to
believe that the entrant is going to be successful and replace the incumbent;
then he will switch to the entrant and join the new network12.
Corollary 1 shows that there is a maximum level p of the price diﬀerence
between incumbent and entrant, such that the former (the latter) is going
to be the "winner" of the game among buyers - servicing the whole market
-i fp ≤ p (p>p). The threshold level p depends on the distribution of ﬁrst
order beliefs in the following way.
Proposition 2 Let F(α) and G(α) be two c.d.f. of ﬁrst order beliefs, such
that F(α) ≤ G(α) for any α ∈ [0,1] .L e tp be deﬁned by equation (1) and b p
be deﬁned by equation (2). Then it is p ≥ b p.






































, which is a contradiction.
Example 1 Let f(α)=2 α and g(α)=1 . Then we have: F(α)=α2 and
G(α)=α,s oF(α) ≤ G(α). By using equations (1) and (2), you may easily
check that p ≈ 0.24 and b p =0 .
Example 1 highlights an important point. If the distribution of ﬁrst order
beliefs is uniform, than the threshold level for the price diﬀerence between
incumbent and entrant is zero. The uniform distribution is "neutral": the
12The model is able to account for the particular case where consumers enter the game
with homogenous beliefs, i.e. they all have the same value of α. In this case expectations
converge to qe
I =1or qe
I =0at the level of second order beliefs (depending on whether
α ≥ cmI or α<c m I). Of course, if α =1(or α =0 ) for all buyers, then ﬁrst order beliefs
themselves are equilibrium beliefs.
12heterogenous beliefs of consumers - as to which ﬁrm is going to win competi-
tion - do not create a competitive advantage for one of them13.I ft h i si st h e
case, the supplier announcing the lower price is able to attract the critical
mass of buyers and consequently to cover the whole market. In the end, the
game among suppliers would turn out to be much like a competition àl a
Bertrand14.
This result provides a natural way to model the competitive advantage
typically enjoyed by the incumbent in a network industry. Remember that
I was the only supplier before the current period - i.e. before E would try
to enter the market. In other words, the entrant is trying to challenge the
dominant position of a supplier who has already reached his critical mass. It
is then reasonable to assume that consumers’ expectations are not neutral;
to the contrary, they are biased in favor of the incumbent. If this is the case,
then p>0: the incumbent retains his position even with pI >p E,p r o v i d e d
the diﬀerence is not too large. This point is formalized in the following
Corollary, where the aggregate distribution of ﬁrst order beliefs is supposed
to be biased in favor of the incumbent.
Corollary 2 Let F(α) be the c.d.f. of ﬁrst order beliefs, such that F(α) ≤ α
for any α ∈ [0,1].T h e np ≥ 0, where p is deﬁned by equation (1).
Proof. Trivial, by application of Proposition 2 with G(α)=α.
Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 show that the incumbent can enjoy a com-
petitive advantage, due only to the favorable beliefs of consumers: the pop-
ulation of buyers is - at the aggregate level - more inclined to think that the
incumbent, rather than the entrant, will be able to achieve his critical mass.
This attitude is justiﬁed by the fact that the incumbent is already there, so
actually all he has to do is to keep with him a suﬃcient number of customers
as to satisfy its critical mass condition; to the contrary, the entrant has to
build up its critical mass of customers, starting from zero. The advantage
enjoyed by the incumbent is larger, the more biased are customers’ beliefs.
13Note that we are not saying that each individual consumer has the same evaluation of
the two suppliers, which would require α =0 .5 for all buyers. We are instead saying that
the aggregate distribution of (ﬁrst order) beliefs is such that neither of the two suppliers
is favoured over the other.
14With the speciﬁcity that I would retain the whole market in case of equal prices.
133.4 The complete game: exclusion or entry
So far, we have focussed our attention on the game among buyers. Now
we turn to the decision problem of the two producers, namely which price to
announce. Actually, in Proposition 3 the optimal strategies for both ﬁrms and
consumers are speciﬁed, thus describing the Nash equilibrium of the complete
game (stages 2 and 3 above). Remember that pI ∈ [c,1] and pE ∈ [0,1],s o
p ∈ [c − 1,1]. Moreover, for the reason outlined above, we restrict to the
region where p ∈ [0,1)15.
Proposition 3 The Nash equilibrium of the complete game is the following:
-i fp ≥ c: pI = p, pE =0 , q∗
I =1("exclusion");
-i fp<c : pI = c, pE = c − p (minus a small  ), q∗
I =0("entry").
Proof. Exclusion. I does not deviate, as lowering pI would lower his proﬁt
and increasing pI would make his sales and proﬁtd r o pt oz e r o .E does not
deviate, as increasing pE would not alter his payoﬀ.T h e np = p → q∗
I =1
(by Corollary 1).
Entry. I does not deviate, as increasing pI would not alter his payoﬀ.
E does not deviate, as lowering pE would lower his proﬁt and increasing pE
would make his sales and proﬁtd r o pt oz e r o . T h e np>p → q∗
I =0(by
Corollary 1).
Proposition 3 shows that the outcome of the complete game depends on
the value of p: it is crucial whether this threshold level for the price diﬀerence
lies above or below the cost diﬀerence between incumbent and entrant (c).
Suppose p ≥ c: by setting pI = p, the incumbent is able to avoid entry -
even if the entrant announces the lowest possible price (zero) - and to enjoy
an o n - n e g a t i v ep r o ﬁt( πI = p − c). In doing so, he exploits his advantage
in terms of consumers’ expectations, which is so large as to overcome his
cost disadvantage. This case points to a possible coordination failure among
consumers, as the more eﬃcient producer is prevented from entering the
market, although he commits to charge a lower price than the incumbent. To
the contrary, if p<cthe entrant is able to successfully challenge the position
of the incumbent and actually enter the market: even if I announces a price
a sl o wa sh ec a n( pI = c), E can undercut by setting a price a bit lower
15T h ec a s ew h e r ep takes negative values looks unlikely, as it needs ﬁrst order beliefs be
biased in favor of the entrant, so that he can be successful even though applying a higher
price than the incumbent. This presumably requires the entrant being very strong, as far
as product quality and marketing ability are concerned.
14than pI − p, thus covering the whole market and earning a positive proﬁt
(πE = c − p).
4 The entry decision
In the above model, I did not formally include the decision problem of the
entrant as to whether (try to) enter the market in the ﬁrst place. However,
this issue can be easily addressed through an informal discussion.
If a potential entrant does not even try to enter, his payoﬀ is zero. Then he
decides to try only if he expects a positive payoﬀ from entering, large enough
to compensate any sunk cost of entry. Of course, he has to take his decision
before entry (if any) occurs, so before consumers’ beliefs are formed. Thus,
it is realistic to assume that such decision is based on an estimate of p (say
a noisy signal e p = p +e ε,w h e r ee ε is a white noise error term), while the true
value p w o u l db eo b s e r v e do n l yi nc a s eE were actually trying to enter and
marketing his product. So he might under-(over-)estimate the competitive
advantage of the incumbent due to consumers’ expectations, although on
average his forecast is correct.
Therefore, if E’s forecast is such that he does not expect a suﬃcient proﬁt
from entering, I continues to be a monopolist. If instead E expects a positive
proﬁt from entering (larger than sunk costs), he tries to enter and the game
analyzed in the above model takes place, leading to one of the two equilibria
described in Proposition 3 (entry or exclusion).
A (potential) entrant might make two kinds of mistakes. He might under-
estimate the incumbent’s advantage (due to consumers’ expectations), so
that he takes the wrong decision to enter (e p<c≤ p): if this is the case,
he faces a stronger incumbent than expected, and he ends up with a failure.
On the other hand, he might over-estimate the incumbent’s advantage and
not even try to enter the market, although entry were a proﬁtable business
(p<c≤ e p).
This argument is able to explain an apparent paradox, possibly observed
in a network industry: empirical evidence may show repeated entry tries (by
diﬀerent ﬁrms), all of them ending up in a failure16.T h i sd o e sn o ti m p l ya n
irrational behavior of entrants (systematic forecast error). It may rather be
16This seems to be the case in the stock exchange industry. See the evidence provided
by the UK Competition Commission (2005 - Appendix H), showing seven cases of failed
entry into the European stock exchange sector during the last decade.
15explained by the fact that only the ﬁrst type of mistake (under-estimation of
p) is actually observable, while the second type is not, as it does not induce
potential entrants to take any action.
5 Welfare analysis and policy implications
Proposition 3 identiﬁes two equilibria: one with exclusion and the other one
with entry. The comparison between them shows that entry is preferable,
whatever welfare criterion is adopted: either total surplus (consumers’ plus
producers’) or consumers’ surplus only.
Total surplus is equal to 1 in the entry equilibrium, as SE =1− pE and
πE = pE.I ti se q u a lt o1 − c in the exclusionary equilibrium, as SI =1− pI
and πI = pI − c. Thus the exclusion of the more eﬃcient entrant entails a
productive ineﬃciency, which reduces total welfare by c.
Consumers’ surplus is at least as large as (1−c) in case of entry: if p =0 ,
then E is able to enter by setting pE = c (actually, a bit lower than that); as
p gets higher, E h a st ol o w e rh i sp r i c e ,u n t i lpE =0when p is (almost) equal
to c;t h u sSE ∈ [1 − c,1]. To the contrary, consumers’ surplus is at most as
large as (1 − c) with exclusion: pI = p,w h e r ep ∈ [c,1),s oSI ∈ (0,1 − c].
Therefore SE ≥ SI: consumers are better oﬀ with entry than without.
The exclusionary behavior of the incumbent is detrimental both for pro-
ductive eﬃciency and for consumers’ welfare. On the other hand, it might be
interesting to ask whether the entry threat, even when unsuccessful, is able
to bring some welfare improvement. The answer is negative, if we look at
total surplus: this is equal to 1−c in the exclusionary equilibrium and in the
monopoly equilibrium as well (absent any entry threat). But the answer gets
positive if we focus on consumers: the incumbent monopolist - absent any
threat of entry - charges a price equal to 1, extracting the whole consumers’
surplus; to the contrary, in order to exclude an entrant he has to lower his
price below such level, to the beneﬁt of consumers. So, from consumers’ per-
spective, the equilibrium with exclusion is worse than that with entry, but it
is better than a monopoly without any threat of entry.
The last result may be relevant for merger policy. In the context analyzed
here, the merger between the incumbent and another ﬁrm - currently operat-
ing in a diﬀerent geographic/product market - should be carefully considered
by the anti-trust authorities: in particular, a condition for authorization
should be that the merger does not eliminate all signiﬁcant threats of entry
16into the incumbent’s market, even if entry is not likely to be successful.
An example, where the above criterion has been applied, is provided by
the Report of the UK Competition Commission (2005), relative to the pro-
posed mergers between the London Stock Exchange and either Euronext or
the Deutsche Borse. The horizontal mergers have not been seen as able to
lessen competition in the market for trading services on UK shares, as other
potential entrants remain. However, the authorization has been subordinated
to the implementation of (structural and behavioral) remedies, aimed at re-
moving the vertical control of both Euronext and DB over their post-trading
infrastructures: such vertical control has been judged able to jeopardize com-
petition in the trading sector (through foreclosure). This position of the UK
CC relies on the assumption that, despite the observation of several failed
entries, the entry threat is a valuable source of competitive pressure in the
trading services industry. Indeed, in some cases the incumbents have dra-
matically reduced their fees to defend their dominant positions17.
Finally, the model provides an argument supporting the imposition of
compatibility among networks. As noted above, in the framework of this
paper compatibility is not a market outcome, as the incumbent would never
sign a compatibility agreement. By imposing compatibility, the regulator
would make the networks of the two competitors be of equal size, so this
variable would become irrelevant in the competitive game among them. Then
competition would be only in prices; given the higher cost of production,
the incumbent would be unable to exclude the entrant, to the beneﬁto f
consumers and of eﬃciency.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Summing up, the model presented here is able to show that ﬁr m sm a k ea
substantial contribution, through their pricing policies, in determining which
equilibrium prevails, following the decision of an entrant ﬁrm to challenge the
dominant position of an incumbent in a network service industry. The ﬁnal
outcome of the entry game does not only depend on exogenous consumers’
expectations, but also on the optimal choices of producers. More speciﬁcally:
17Euronext lowered its fees by up to 50% following the DTS-LSE initiative aimed at
attracting trades on Dutch shares; LSE slashed its fees by more than 60% to face compe-
tition with the new entrant Tradepoint/Virt-x. See Competition Commission (2005) and
Di Noia (1999).
17starting from an initial (out-of-equilibrium) set of exogenous heterogeneous
expectations, prices act as a coordination device in the process of expecta-
tions convergence, where consumers try to forecast which ﬁrm will eventually
reach its critical mass; thus equilibrium (homogenous) expectations are en-
dogenous, as they depend on prices. While expectations may be driven by a
number of factors (e.g. quality, advertising), this work has focussed on prices:
for example an incumbent, by reacting aggressively to an entry threat, might
be able to convince his own customers that he will be able to retain his
customer base, and this belief becomes self-fulﬁlling.
The incumbent possibly enjoys an advantage, in terms of consumers’ ini-
tial expectations, but this does not necessarily allow him to retain his dom-
inant position: his ability to exclude the entrant crucially depends on the
magnitude of such advantage, relative to its cost disadvantage.
On one hand, exclusion requires the incumbent to lower his price below
the monopoly level - the one he would select absent any entry threat. On the
other hand, the entrant may be successful only by undercutting the incum-
bent’s price by a suﬃciently large amount. So the model is able to account
for aggressive pricing policies, commonly observed when an incumbent and
an entrant compete for the market.
Welfare analysis shows that both productive eﬃciency and consumers’
welfare are hurt by exclusion. However, consumers beneﬁt from the threat of
entry, even when entry is not successful. Imposing compatibility among net-
works is welfare improving, as it removes the exclusionary potential enjoyed
by the incumbent.
These insights are made possible by an explicit analysis of the impact of
prices on expectations, where the latter are (partially) endogenized. Absent
this type of analysis, one of the two extremes would obtain: exogenous equi-
librium expectations would completely support either the incumbent or the
entrant, with the "winner" ﬁrm setting his price at the monopoly level.
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